ABSTRACT Secure outsourced aggregation in the Internet of Things (IoT) can solve the problem that sensing devices are limited in energy and bandwidth by outsourcing data aggregation task to a third-party service provider. Location-based secure outsourced aggregation (LBOA), aggregating data whose location satisfies user's location strategy, is very important in some location-critical scenarios (e.g., smart homes, intelligent transportation, and smart city). Recent work studied secure data aggregation to reduce transmission overhead and network bandwidth by optimizing topology of networks or adopting the cryptographic approach. However, as far as we know, scarcely any work considers the location information of the data source and the privacy protection of the data at the same time in the studies of secure outsourced aggregation. In this paper, we first propose an LBOA scheme LBOA Max , which can return the maximum value of sensory data whose location satisfies location strategy by applying one-way chain, order-preserving encryption, and some other cryptographic operation. Then, we proposed scheme LBOA Top−k and scheme LBOA Sum , which can return the largest k values of data and the summation value of data based on location, respectively. The security analysis results show that our schemes can satisfy the defined requirements and the experiment results show that our schemes are feasible and efficient for each entity in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the continuous development and improvement of wireless network technology [1] , IoT has been more and more widely used in our life [2] . For example, in smart homes [3] , smart devices are connected to the external service through the network of IoT, realizing interaction between external service and smart devices. In the field of electronic medical system [4] , patients' vital signs such as heart rate and blood pressure can be monitored by wearable devices. IoT is also widely used in intelligent transportation, environmental monitoring, military and many other fields.
However, sensing devices in IoT are usually limited in energy and bandwidth [5] , and their computation and storage power are limited. What's more, in general, data requester cannot interact with sensing devices directly in IoT. Outsourcing [6] - [8] data aggregation task to a third service
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Unfortunately, aggregator is usually untrusted, it may have malicious behaviors. On one hand, aggregator may filch sensory data. In some fields such as electronic medical, the confidentiality of sensory data is very important [11] . Sensing devices do not want aggregator to learn any knowledge about the data while outsourcing aggregation task to aggregator. Thus, how to ensure the confidentiality of data is a challenging question in outsourced aggregation. On the other hand, aggregator may tamper the aggregation process and report a wrong aggregated result to data requester. Thus, the verifiability of the aggregated result is also essential in outsourced aggregation.
Most of the existing work related to secure data aggregation has not considered the location of data source. However, location-based secure outsourced aggregation, i.e. securely aggregate data under location strategy, is very important in some location-critical scenarios. In many IoT applications, the data collected by the sensing device is closely related to the location information of the sensing device [12] . For example, in intelligent transportation, the location-critical data sensed by smart devices is one of the most important elements for monitoring, analyzing and forecasting road conditions. In smart homes, the location of data source plays an important role. In applications such as geographic key distribution [13] and geographic routing [14] , the smart devices' location also plays a crucial role.
Therefore, a location-based secure outsourced aggregation scheme is necessary in IoT to realize aggregating data based on devices' location. Due to the reason that Max, Top-k and Sum are some of the most basic operations of data. Thus, we try to construct location-based secure outsourced aggregation schemes in which aggregator only aggregates data whose location is at the specified position and return the Max or Top-k or Sum value to data requester. However, this work is very challenging. First, it is a challenging task to achieve location-based in IoT because the traditional methods to determine location is not efficient and not suitable to IoT. Second, it is difficult to protect data confidentiality against outside attacker and untrusted aggregator while aggregator needs to aggregate data and return the aggregated result to data requester. Third, it is hard to ensure that aggregator does not have malicious behaviors and guarantee that the user could verify the validity of aggregated result because user cannot get all the raw sensory data in the whole process of aggregation. What's more, the privacy of devices' location and the confidentiality of user's location strategy should also be protected.
Our contributions. We put emphasis on realization of secure outsourced aggregation based on location in this study. First, in order to determine whether the sensing device's location satisfies location strategy or not, we adopt vector operation, which using the geometric relationship of the spatial data's location. Second, in order to protect the confidentiality of data, we adopt order-preserving encryption scheme [15] to realize comparing directly on ciphertexts. Third, in order to ensure the verifiability of the aggregation process, we adopt one-way chain [16] , which consists of a series of one-way functions. At the same time, we utilize public key encryption algorithm to achieve protecting the privacy of data's location and the confidentiality of user's location strategy.
Our contributions in this study are fourfold. 1) We design the system model of location-based secure outsourced aggregation in IoT. Then we propose the threat model. Next we propose our design goal. The system model of LBOA defines the participants including location-sensitive devices, user and cloud service provider. The system model also defines the participants' task. The threat model in this study describes the adversarial behaviors including data tampering, cheating, data deleting and so on. The design goal of LBOA in this study presents the requirements such as providing service based on location, achieving location privacy protection, data confidentiality protection and location strategy confidentiality protection. 2) We propose a novel location-based secure outsourced aggregation scheme LBOA Max which can return the maximum value under user's location strategy. Then we propose scheme LBOA Top−k and scheme LBOA Sum which can return the largest k values and the summation value under user's location strategy respectively. Our schemes could aggregate data whose location is at specified location correctly. They could also protect the confidentiality of data and the privacy of the location strategy. 3) We theoretically analyze the security of LBOA. The analysis results show that our schemes satisfy our design goal. At the same time, our schemes support much more data aggregation query operations and are much more secure than existing schemes. 4) We report experimental evaluations of LBOA. The evaluation results show that our schemes are efficient and feasible in practice.
II. RELATED WORK A. AGGREGATION
Tan and Körpeoglu [17] proposed a power efficient data gathering and aggregation scheme in wireless sensor networks. Rajagopalan and Varshney [18] introduced data aggregation techniques in sensor networks. Chen et al. [19] presented a data aggregation scheme with distributed randomized algorithms. Hekmat and Van Mieghem [20] constructed the shortest path aggregation tree that maximizes network lifetime. Chang and Yen [21] constructed a spanning tree based aggregate routing algorithm, selecting the node that performs the data aggregation operation through the coding tree. Lee et al. [22] presented a construct which use geographical route to balance network traffic, and optimize network lifetime and aggregate data rate through optimization methods. However, these data aggregation schemes are mainly concerned with the issue of energy conservation without focusing on the security of data aggregation. The security problem of data aggregation [23] began to be studied at home and abroad in recent years, but they mainly focus on safe energy conservation and safe routing at early period. Some work focus on the security of data later. Work in [24] , [25] introduced privacy homomorphism technology and proposed data aggregation schemes based on privacy homomorphism. These schemes aggregate encrypted data directly without decryption in order to protect end-to-end privacy of data. Zhu et al. [26] proposed a secure data aggregation scheme based on commitment-proof and back testing in order to protect the integrality of data. Chen et al. [27] combined homomorphic encryption with bilinear-based signature, and proposed a recoverable data aggregation scheme to ensure data privacy and integrity. Li et al. [28] proposed a privacy preserving data aggregation scheme for mobile edge computing assisted IoT application. However, all of these work only focus on protecting data privacy and integrity 43870 VOLUME 7, 2019 but not pay attention to the basic data aggregation query operations such as max, min, count, top-k and so on.
Later, some work focus on the basic query operations in secure aggregation. Chan et al. proposed a secure data aggregation scheme (SIA) [29] . However, this scheme only supports one aggregator, and it is not applicable to large amounts of data. Then they extended SIA and proposed a secure hierarchical aggregation scheme (SHIA) [30] that supports multiple aggregators. This work only supports limited sets of aggregation functions but not supports aggregation functions such as max and top-k. Nath et al. [16] proposed a secure outsourced aggregation scheme which uses one-way chain and related cryptography operations to ensure the security of aggregation. This work supports several aggregation functions such as max, count and top-k, but it doesn't protect the privacy of data.
In summary, none of the above data aggregation schemes consider the location of data source.
B. LOCATION VERIFICATION
Vora and Nesterenko [31] proposed a location verification scheme that can achieve verifying location in-region of provers. Sastry et al. [32] proposed a location verification scheme which can realize verification in a small circular region. Čapkun et al. [33] proposed a scheme which can verify the location through mobile base stations. Sciancalepore et al. [34] proposed a scheme which realize secure location verification by the help of meteor burst communication.
Chandran et al. [35] proposed location-based cryptography in 2009, using user's geographic location information as the user's unique credential. Under BRM model, they proposed secure positioning (SP) protocol which can be proven secure. SP protocol can be used to verify whether the user's location is at the specified location or not. However, SP protocol requires multiple verifiers work together to verify the legitimacy of the location.
Zhang et al. [12] proposed a universally composable secure positioning scheme in the bounded retrieval model. It realized secure location verification. Zhang et al. [36] investigated a scheme which can achieve secure geographical area verification without pre-shared secret. This work is propitious to massive location-critical devices in IoT.
All of work above need verifiers to realize location verification. They also require precise time synchronization, and are not robust to computation delay.
C. LOCATION-BASED SOLUTION
Kwon et al. [13] proposed a scheme of location-based pairwise key distribution for wireless sensor networks which can achieve perfect resilience and higher connectivities with less resources. Li et al. [14] proposed an energy efficent cooperative geographic routing scheme in wireless sensor networks which based on sensor nodes' location information. Zhang et al. [37] proposed a position based key exchange scheme which can achieve both security and performance perspectives. Ji et al. [38] proposed a blockchain-based multi-level privacy-preserving location sharing scheme which can achieve security and flexibility of location privacy protection. Gao et al. [39] proposed a logistics information privacy protection scheme with position and attribute-based access control which can achieve privacy protection of both logistics information and personal information.
Wang et al. [40] combined data's location with searchable encryption and proposed a secure geometric search scheme on encrypted spatial data. This scheme determined whether the data's location is at specified location or not by executing vector operation which the geometric relationship of the spatial data's location is used. This method of verifying the location of data is very efficient and is suitable to IoT.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. VECTOR OPERATION BASED ON GEOMETRIC RELATIONSHIP
The essence of vector operation based on geometric relationship is based on circular geometry [40] .
Given a random point (x, y) and a circle which (x c , y c ) is the circle center and R is the radius. If the point (x, y) is on the boundary of the given circle, we have:
B. ORDER-PRESERVING ENCRYPTION
Order-preserving encryption (OPE) [15] is a special symmetric encryption scheme which guarantees the orders of ciphertexts are the same as the orders of plaintexts. An OPE scheme generally contains KeyGen, Enc and Dec. Specifically,
• KeyGen(1 λ ) → k: input a security parameter λ, output a secret key k.
• Enc(k, m) → C m : input a secret key k and plaintext m, output ciphertext C m .
• Dec(k, C m ) → m: input a secret key k and ciphertext C m , output plaintext m.
OPE has the property that:
C. ONE-WAY FUNCTION AND ONE-WAY CHAIN
A function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * is a one-way function [41] if f (x) can be calculated by a polynomial time algorithm which takes input x, but the possibility that any adversary attempt to compute a pseudo-inverse for f successfully can be negligible. That is, for every PPT adversary A there is a negligible function v A such that for a sufficiently large k, One-way chain [42] is based on secure one-way function and random seed s. One-way chain recurs applying one-way function for multiple times. We use F x (s) to denote recursively applying one-way function F for x times. The chain has the value F 1 (s), F 2 (s), F 3 (s), F 4 (s), . . . sequentially. Due to the property of one-way function, given the value of F x (s), we can calculate F x (s) if x > x, however, if x < x, the probability to get F x (s) can be negligible. In other words, one-way chain can only be rolled forward, it is infeasible to be rolled backward.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATIONS A. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model of location-based secure outsourced aggregation (LBOA) is shown in Figure 1 . It contains of three entities: user (User), cloud service provider (CSP) and location-sensitive device (LSD).
If a user, which can also be called a data requester, wants to obtain some values (such as the maximum value, the largest k values, the summation value and so on) of LSD's sensory data, he (or she) will send request to the CSP. CSP asks for LSD's data after receiving the request, then LSD submits data to CSP. CSP does aggregation operation after receiving all the data and then returns aggregated result to the user. User verifies aggregated result after receiving the aggregated result. More specifically, we describe as follows.
User. User acts as data requester. User determines the location strategy and operation function. He (or she) would like to get LSD's data that satisfying the location strategy and the operation function. However, user cannot interact with LSD directly. Thus, user sends requests to CSP, then CSP aggregates LSD's data and returns aggregated result to user. User will verify the correctness and completeness of the aggregated result after receiving the aggregated result from CSP.
CSP. CSP acts as a connection between location sensitive devices and user. There may be one or multiple aggregators in CSP to do aggregation task. CSP has the ability to do calculation operation and aggregation operation. He (or she) receives data from LSDs and aggregates the data to get an aggregated result, and then sends the aggregated result to user.
LSD. LSD acts as data collector. There are multiple location sensitive devices. Each LSD has a location coordinate. LSD can interact with CSP. LSD may collect sensory data and then outsource data aggregation task to CSP.
B. THREAT MODEL
We considered four participants in threat model. 1) User. We assume the user is totally trusted.
2) CSP. The cloud service provider may have three types of malicious behaviors. First, CSP may tamper the aggregation process and trick user with wrong aggregated result. Second, CSP may ignore or delete some location-sensitive devices' data. Third, CSP may add an illegal LSD into the aggregation process. 3) LSD. The location-sensitive devices are honest-butcurious. They will not transmit faked data, they will not misreport their location, but they will try to pry the location of other location-sensitive devices. 4) Outside Attacker. Outside attacker also may cause attacks. Outside attacker refers to the adversary who obtains some knowledge about the legitimate location-sensitive device's data or user's location strategy via public channels. An outside attacker may intercept the data sensed by LSD and may intercept user's location strategy.
C. DESIGN GOAL
Accoring to the requirements and the threat model of location-based secure outsourced aggregation, the proposed schemes should satisfy the following design goal:
1) Achieve secure aggregation based on sensing devices' location (LB). Our schemes should realize aggregation based on location. CSP should aggregate data whose location satisfies user's location strategy. 2) Support some basic query operations in aggregation such as Max, Top-k and Sum. Our schemes should achieve returning the Max (Top-k/Sum) value of data under user's location strategy correctly. 3) Guarantee the verifiability of aggregation (AV). Our schemes should guarantee CSP does not tamper the aggregation process. Our schemes should also ensure that the correctness and completeness of the aggregated result reported by CSP can be verified by user. 4) Guarantee the privacy of the LSD's location (LSDP).
Our schemes should ensure any entity except the location-sensitive device itself and the totally trusted user could not learn any location information about the legitimate sensing devices. 5) Guarantee the confidentiality of the data (DC). Our schemes should guarantee the data confidentiality against outside attacker (DCO). As the CSP is untrusted, our schemes should also guarantee the data confidentiality against CSP (DCC). In other words, our schemes should ensure the data sensed by location-sensitive devices will not be intercepted by outside attacker and CSP. 6) Guarantee the confidentiality of location strategy (LSC). Our schemes should ensure the confidentiality of user's location strategy. Only the user itself and location-sensitive devices can learn the location strategy.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEMES
Starting from this section, we present our LBOA schemes. The notations used in this study are listed in Table 1 . Section 5.A explains scheme LBOA Max which user requests the maximum value of data whose location satisfies user's location strategy. Section 5.B explains scheme LBOA Top−k which user requests the largest k values of data whose location satisfies user's location strategy. Section 5.C explains scheme LBOA Sum which user requests the summation value of data whose location satisfies the location strategy.
A. LBOA MAX
The overview of LBOA Max is shown in Figure 2 .
Scheme LBOA Max consists of the following five phases: the initialization phase, the request phase, the collection phase, the aggregation phase and the verification phase. Initialization phase generates parameters which are required later. During the request phase, user formulates location strategy and operation function, then sends request messages to CSP. CSP transmits request messages to LSD and requests LSD to submit the value of sensory data. During the collection phase, location-sensitive devices judge whether the location of data meet user's location strategy or not, and then submit the response to CSP. During the aggregation phase, CSP does aggregation task, and then sends the aggregated result to user. During the verification phase, user verifies the aggregated result reported by the CSP.
1) INITIALIZATION
During the initialization phase, each S i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) with an ID i registers a public/private key pair (PK i , SK i ). User also has a certified public/private key pair (PK U , SK U ). Each S i consults a symmetric key K i with user. And then user maintains a group key GK with all LSDs.
2) REQUEST
The specific steps of this phase are described below.
(1) The user picks a random a ∈ Z p , assuming that the
In other words, the random integer a meets the condition that for any
(2) The user decides the operation function f . In this LBOA Max scheme, f = Max. (3) The user presets the location strategy P = {P 1 ,
The user utilizes group key GK to encrypt a, P and the symmetric key K OPE , i.e.,
where epoch# denotes timestamp of the current time.
(5) User sends {f = Max C Request } to CSP. (6) CSP preserves the operation function f = Max after receiving all the messages send by the user, at the same time, CSP transmits {f = Max C Request } to location-sensitive devices, and requests to collect LSD's sensory data.
3) COLLECTION
After receiving the messages from CSP, location-sensitive devices submit their sensory data. The details of this phase are illustrated as follows.
(1) Each S i decrypts the broadcast message to get the plaintexts of a, P and K OPE , i.e., (2) As shown in Figure 3 , each LSD discretizes its position coordinate (x i , y i ) to get integer coordinate (x i , y i ). If the error tolerance is no more than L. For any noninteger point, we can approximate it as a nearest integer point which the distance between them is no more than L. The detail of coordinate discretization is described in Algorithm
. Signing u i with S i s secret key SK i , and then encrypt u i with user's public key PK u , i.e.,
Algorithm 1 Coordinate Discretization

Require:
Point location coordinate (x , y ); ouput space S;
Integer coordinate (x, y) 1: LSD executes: 
(4) Each location-sensitive device S i encrypts D i by order-preserving encryption, i.e.,
(5) Each location-sensitive device S i generates:
where epoch# denotes timestamp of the current time. ). We use RSA as the one-way function F in this study.
4) AGGREGATION
During the phase of aggregation, the following steps are executed in sequence.
(
CSP compares the value of C D i after receiving all the message from LSDs. Assuming that the value of S m 's data is the maximum value, which is known by the CSP. We use C D m to represent the encrypted maximum value.
(3) CSP computes the aggregated result
, p and q are two large prime number used in one-way function (RSA).
(4) CSP sends the aggregated result
) to the user.
5) VERIFICATION
User verifies the correctness of the aggregated result reported by CSP in this phase. The specific steps of this phase are described below.
(1) User verifies the validity of ID m and MAC K m first after receiving Figure 4 .
In order to help reader to understand scheme LBOA Max better, we take a simple example. As shown in Figure 5 , the user specifies the location strategy P which is v = (1, 1, 1, 1 ) ) and sends the aggregated result to user. User verifies the correctness of the aggregated result reported by CSP and decrypts C 8 to obtain the plaintext of the maximum value at the specified location.
6) DISCUSSION OF LBOA MAX a: STATIC VS. DYNAMIC
In our scheme LBOA Max , location-sensitive devices may be static or dynamic. If the location-sensitive devices are static, in other words, if the location of location-sensitive devices will not change after deploying, each S i will only need to register once. If the location-sensitive devices are dynamic, at the beginning of each different process of LBOA Max , the newly added LSDs should be registered and have certified ID. At the same time, the LSDs which are outdated should be logged out.
b: LOCATION STRATEGY
As shown in Figure 6 (a), if we want to determine whether a point (x, y) is on the boundary of a circle C, we could split point (x, y) into a vector u, then we distribute the circle into a vector v, and then compute the inner product < u, v >. If < u, v >= 0 ⇒ (x, y) ∈ C. As shown in Figure 6 (b), in a two-dimensional space, a particular point (x, y) can be uniquely determined by two tangent circles, if < u, v 1 >= 0 and < u, v 2 >= 0 are met at the same time, the point (x, y) is at the specified location.
c: ONE-WAY CHAIN
One-way chain is constructed by a series of one-way functions. There may be multiple aggregators in CSP executing aggregation process at the same time. Thus, the one-way function we adopted should have the property of homomorphism. Due to the reason that RSA has the property of homomorphism, we use RSA as the one-way function F in this study.
If the one-way function used in one-way chain is RSA, multiple values of one-way chain based on the same encryption key can be folded together by using modulo multiplication operation. We use symbol to denote the folding operation in this article. The folded value can be used to make more efficient communication and do verification efficiently. 
B. LBOA TOP−K
In this section, we do some extension to propose scheme LBOA Top−k .
User requests to obtain the largest k values of data under location strategy in LBOA Top−k scheme. It is obvious that we can achieve this by executing LBOA Max scheme repeatedly for k times. who reporting the maximum value of sensory data. Then executing the second invocation of LBOA Max scheme again after excluding the location-sensitive device S m . The second invocation will return the second largest value of data. And then, executing the third invocation of LBOA Max scheme again after excluding the location-sensitive device who reports the second largest value of data. In a similar fashion, the user can get top-k values of data whose location satisfy the location strategy after executing LBOA Max scheme repeatedly for k times.
C. LBOA SUM
LBOA Sum scheme requests to obtain the summation value of data under user's location strategy. Similar to LBOA Max and LBOA Top−k , scheme LBOA Sum also contains of five phases.
The initialization phase is completely identical to 5.A.1 with an additional initialization step: CSP has a certified public/private key pair that we represent as (PK CSP , SK CSP ).
The request phase is identical to 5.A.2 except the operation function f in step (2) is f = Sum, and the step (4) is user utilizes group key GK to encryption a and the location strategy P, i.e.,
Enc(GK
In the phase of collection, Each S i decrypts the broadcast message from the CSP to get the plaintexts of a and P, i.e.,
The second and the third steps are identical to 5.A.3(2) and 5.A.3(3). Then each S i utlizes CSP's public key to encrypt D i , i.e.,
Enc(PK CSP
Next each location-sensitive device S i generates:
( 
After receiving the aggregated result sent by CSP, the user verifies the correctness of aggregated result. The specific steps of this phase are described as follows.
( (3) If the following three conditions are met at the same time, user believes that the aggregated result reported by CSP is correct. And then user computes Sum = Sum CSP −a(n−h). Sum denotes the summation value of data who meets user's location strategy.
• The values in Top−(n−h) is the same as the first (n−h) values in Top − (n − h + 1).
• The last value in Top − (n − h + 1) is 1, in other words, the minimum value in Top − (n − h + 1) is 1.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze that our schemes satisfy all the security goal. We take LBOA Max as an example. The analysis of LBOA Top−k and LBOA Sum are similar to that of LBOA Max .
A. AGGREGATION VERIFIABILITY
Our scheme LBOA Max can guarantee the verifiability of aggregation. In other words, our scheme can guarantee the aggregation process not to be tampered by CSP. We analyze it from the following two aspects. VOLUME 7, 2019
1. In this part, we don't discuss the case that CSP maliciously delete or increase the nodes participating in the aggregation, we only consider that CSP false reports the aggregated result.
Our scheme can guarantees CSP reports the true Max, put another way, our scheme can prevent CSP reporting a value smaller or larger than the true Max. Let ) is an one-way chain which can only roll forward but cannot roll backward. So the probability to calculate all the S i 's value of F C Dm (S − i ) can be negligible. Therefore, our scheme is secure since the CSP can't abduct the user to accept an incorrect aggregated result by tampering with the aggregation process.
2. In this part, we mainly consider the case that CSP discards the LSD that reads the largest value among all the LSDs who satisfy the location strategy, or CSP adds an illegal LSD that reads a value larger than the true largest reading of legitimate LSDs in our scheme.
1 Our scheme can guarantee CSP cannot delete or ignore the true largest value under location strategy. In the initilization phase, each S i negotiates a symmetric key K i with user. After LSD sending aggregated result i ) reported by CSP. What's more, similar to our analysis above, due to the characteristic of one-way chain, if CSP discards the true largest value and regards a value smaller than it as the largest one, the probability to calculate all the S i 's value of F C Dm (S − i ) can be negligible. 2 Our scheme can guarantee CSP will not add an illegal LSD which reads a value D m larger than the true largest value D m . Assuming that the vector of the illegal LSD's location is u m . After user receiving the aggregated result reported by the CSP, user will verify the validity of S + m firstly.
Similar to our analysis above, S + m must generated by a legitimate LSD. But there are no legitimate LSD has the value of D m , so the adversary must forge the MAC. However the probability that adversary could forge the MAC successfully can be negligible. What's more, after user verifying the correctness of aggregated result, user will get the location (x m , y m ) from u m . (x m , y m ) is illegal, so it is impossible to pass the verification of the user.
B. LOCATION PRIVACY
Location privacy means the location of LSD should only be known by the LSD itself and the totally trusted user. Thus, any other entity including other LSDs, the CSP and outside attacker cannot learn any knowledge about the location of LSD.
In our scheme LBOA Max , we adopt a secure asymmetric encryption algorithm and signature algorithm. At the phase of collection, LSD utilizes S i 's secret key SK i to sign u i , then LSD utilizes user's public key PK u to encrypt u i , i.e. Enc(PK U , Sig(SK i , u i )) → C u i . Since the asymmetric encryption algorithm is semantically secure, it can against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA). The ciphertexts generated by public key encryption algorithm are indistinguishable. In other words, for any two given location plaintext u 1 and u 2 , and their location ciphertext is C u 1 and C u 2 respectively, the probability that the adversary can dis-
is negligible. This means that only the user who has secret key SK u could decrypt the ciphertext C u i , any other third party could not learn any knowledge about the location plaintext u i . Since the signature algorithm is semantically secure which can against adaptive chosen message attack (CMA), signature is unforgeable. The probability for adversary who does not have the secret key SK i to forge a signature of S i correctly is negligible.
Therefore, the privacy of location-sensitive devices' location can be achieved in our scheme.
C. DATA CONFIDENTIALITY
Data confidentiality refers to the confidentiality of data d i , which is the raw value of LSD's sensory data. Our schemes can ensure the data sensed by LSD will not be intercepted by external attacker. In LBOA Max , the scheme also can ensure the data sensed by LSD will not be intercepted by CSP. In our scheme LBOA Max , at the phase of collection, LSD judges whether its location satisfies user's location strategy 
. While in another session, user picks a 2 ∈ Z p , a 2 may not be equal to a 1 Consequently, the confidentiality of the data can be guaranteed in our scheme.
D. LOCATION STRATEGY CONFIDENTIALITY
Location strategy confidentiality refers to that the user's location strategy P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n } can only be learned by legitimate LSDs and the user itself, any other entity including the untrusted CSP and outside attackers could learn nothing about user's location privacy.
In our scheme, at the phase of initialization, each legitimate S i consults a symmetric key K i with the user, user maintains a group key GK . At the phase of request, user adopts a secure asymmetric encryption algorithm, and utilizes group key GK to encrypt the location strategy P of the user, i.e., Enc(GK , a P K OPE epoch#) → C Request . What's more, the location strategy P is encrypted by the group key GK . That means for any legitimate S i who has consulted a symmetric key K i with the user, it can decrypt the ciphertext C Request to get location strategy P. However, for any other participants, including CSP, the probability to decrypt C Request which is encrypted by user's group key GK to get the plaintext of user's location strategy P can be negligible.
Therefore, the privacy of location strategy could be protected in our scheme. In this section, we compare our schemes with some related work including RCDA [27] , SHIA [30] , OA-WC [16] and Geo-SE [40] . The comparison results are shown in Table 2 . '' √ '' means satisfied, ''×'' means dissatisfied and ''-'' means uninvolved. LB means location-based, DCO means data confidentiality against outside attacker, DCC means data confidentiality against CSP, LSC means location strategy privacy, LSDP means location-sensitive device privacy, AV means aggregation verifiability. From Table 2 , it is obvious that RCDA [27] cannot support data aggregation functions. SHIA [30] cannot support Max and Top-k. It also cannot protect the confidentiality of data. OA-WC [16] cannot support Sum and cannot protect the confidentiality of data. Geo-SE [40] is location-based. It can protect the privacy of LSD, the confidentiality of data and location strategy. But this work does not focus on data aggregation. Our scheme LBOA Max and LBOA Top−k satisfy all the properties in Table 2 , LBOA Sum satisfies all the properties except DCC.
B. COMPUTATION EVALUATION
In this section, we mainly focus on evaluation of computation overhead of our schemes. The experiments are implemented on a PC (CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3470 CPU @ 3.20GHz 3.20GHz, RAM:8.00GB, OS: Windows 7), using jdk 1.8.0.
We take scheme LBOA Max as an example. The evaluation of LBOA Top−k is similar to LBOA Max because LBOA Top−k is achieved by executing LBOA Max repeatedly for k times. We do not repeat the evaluation of LBOA Top−k in this study. VOLUME 7, 2019 We evaluate the computation overhead of LSD, CSP and user respectively. We adopt RSA-1024 and Hmac-MD5 in our implementation. We adopt the algorithm in [15] to realize order-preserving encryption. We assume there are 100 location-sensitive devices and the range of the value of LSD's sensory data is [0,100].
1) LSD
As shown in Figure 7 , we evaluate the computation overhead of LSD in the phase of collection. For LBOA Max and LBOA Top−k , we adopt two kinds of different ciphertext-space of OPE respectively. In one case, the ciphertext-space of OPE is 0 − 2 9 . And in the other case, the ciphertext-space of OPE is 0 − 2 10 . It is obvious that the bigger value of LSD's sensory data will lead to slightly higher computation cost. The ciphertext-space of OPE also has effect on computation overhead. When the ciphertext-space is larger, the computation cost of LSD is higher. The computation overhead of LSD in LBOA Top−k is similar to that of LBOA Max . In brief, the processing time is between 0.2-0.3 second. It is acceptable for LSD whose calculation and storage power is limited. As for LBOA Sum , the processing time is much less than 0.05 second. The processing time in LBOA Sum is very short because we does not adopt order-preserving encryption in it. In general, the computation overhead of LSD is practical for LSD who does not have very strong power. 
2) CSP
As shown in Figure 8 , we evaluate the computation overhead of CSP in the phase of aggregation in protocol LBOA Max . The CSP computes the folded value i F C Dm (S The algorithmic we adopted and the data distribution strategy we set are listed detailedly in Table 3 .
From Figure 8 , it is obvious that the number of LSDs satisfying location strategy influence the processing time. The fewer number of LSDs satisfying the location strategy, the higher computation cost of the CSP. The processing time is only about 0.1s when all the LSDs' location satisfy user's location strategy, while the processing time is 1.6s when nearly no LSD's location satisfies user's location strategy. The different distribution strategy also affect the computation overhead. It is obvious that the computation overhead is the highest when the values of LSD's sensory data are distributed uniformly, while the computation overhead is the lowest when the values of LSD's sensory data concentrated on low values. The processing time of high distribution is a little longer than that of medium distribution. In general, the processing time is within the scope of 0.1s and 1.5s, which is acceptable for CSP in practice.
3) USER
As shown in Figure 9 , we evaluate the computation overhead of user in the phase of verification in protocol LBOA Max . In the phase of verification, user computes each S From Figure 9 , the number of LSDs satisfying location strategy has little effect on the computation overhead of user. The distribution strategy of sensory data has much effect on the computation overhead of user. The processing time is about 1.5s, 2.2s, 2.5s and 2.5s when the data distribution strategy is low, medium, high and uniform respectively. The computation overhead is the highest when the data values are uniform distribution or high distribution. The computation overhead is the lowest when the data values are low distribution. When the data values are medium distribution, the computation overhead is higher than that of low distribution.
4) COMPUTATION OVERHEAD UNDER DIFFERENT OPE
As shown in Figure 10 , the ciphertext-space of OPE has effect on the computation overhead. We adopt two kinds of different ciphertext-space of OPE respectively. In one case, the ciphertext-space of OPE is 0 − 2 9 . And in the other case, the ciphertext-space of OPE is 0−2 10 . For user and CSP, if the ciphertext-space of OPE is larger, the computation overhead is higer. For user, the processing time is about 2.6s when the ciphertext-space of OPE is 0 − 2 9 , while the processing time is around 4.2s when the ciphertext-space of OPE is 0 − 2 10 . For CSP, the processing time is within the scope of 0.6s -1.5s when the ciphertext-space of OPE is 0 − 2 9 , while the processing time is within the scope of 1.3s -3s when the ciphertext-space of OPE is 0−2 10 . For LSD, the computation overhead under OPE (2 10 ) is slightly higher than OPE (2 9 ). What's more, the computation overhead of LSD is far less than the computation overhead of CSP and user, which is suitable in practice considering that LSD does not have strong capacity for computation.
5) COMPUTATION OVERHEAD IN LBOA SUM
The computation overhead of aggregation in scheme LBOA Sum is shown in Figure 11 . The computation overhead of verification in scheme LBOA Sum is shown in Figure 12 . The computation overhead of LBOA Sum is much lower than that of LBOA Max and LBOA Top−k because S i utilizes public key cryptography rather than order-preserving encryption to encrypt D i in LBOA Sum . From Figure 11 , it is obvious that the processing time of CSP aggregation is less than 1s. From Figure 12 , the processing time of user verification is less than 0.7s, which is acceptable in practice.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we proposed three novel schemes that can achieve secure outsourced aggregation based on data's location. We proposed LBOA Max to obtain the Max aggregated data first, and then we proposed LBOA Top−k and LBOA Sum to obtain the Top-k and Sum aggregated data respectively. Different from existing schemes, our schemes could realize secure aggregation based on location and could achieve location privacy protection, data confidentiality protection and location strategy confidentiality protection. Next we analyze the security of our schemes and the analysis results show that our schemes satisfy all the defined requirements. Finally, the experiment results show that our schemes are practical and feasible in IoT.
